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Abstract
This paper models two kinds of wage subsidy in a model of the nat-
ural rate having a continuum of workers ranked by their productivity—
a flat wage subsidy and a graduated wage subsidy, each financed by
a proportional payroll tax. In the small open economy case, with
the graduation as specified, we show that both schemes expand em-
ployment throughout the distribution; for those whose productivity is
sufficiently far below the mean, take-home pay is unambiguously up,
though the tax financing lowers take-home pay at the mean and above.
For any particular class of workers paid the same amount of the wage
subsidy under the two plans, the graduated plan expands employment
more. In the closed economy case, employment is increased for work-
ers whose productivity levels are below or equal to the mean but the
interest rate is pulled up, and that may cause employment to fall at
productivity levels sufficiently far above the mean. (JEL E24, H22)
∗Paper presented at Conference on Low-wage Employment Subsidies at Russell Sage
Foundation in December 1997.
1
There is considerable agreement that the extraordinarily low commercial
productivity of active-age persons in the lower reaches of the distribution rel-
ative to median productivity is the number one social problem of our time.
In creating a huge wage gap it makes the less productive incapable of sup-
porting a family or in some cases themselves (in a way meeting community
standards of decency at any rate) and having access to mainstream commu-
nity life. In reducing the wage incentives that private enterprise can afford
to offer low-wage workers relative to their other resources and attractions, it
worsens unemployment and nonparticipation. Both sets of effects operate in
turn, especially in areas where there is a high concentration of these effects,
to increase dependency on welfare and property crime, spread drug use and
violence, widen illegitimacy and blight the upbringing of children (Freeman,
1996; Murray, 1984; Phelps, 1994b, 1997; Wilson, 1996).
There is far less agreement on what, if anything, would be useful to do
about it. An important line of thinking, however, looks to wage subsidies of
one kind or another. The pioneers were Arthur Pigou (1933) and Nicholas
Kaldor (1936), who sought the conditions for employment subsidies to be
self-financing. Targeted hiring subsidies were championed by Daniel Ham-
mermesh (1978), Michael Hurd and John Pencavel (1981) and by Robert
Haveman and John Palmer (1982). The employment-expanding effects of a
constant employment subsidy were studied by Richard Jackman and Richard
Layard (1986). One of us argued informally for a graduated employment
subsidy to raise low-end wage rates (Phelps, 1994a) and to reduce unem-
ployment (Phelps, 1994b) as a counterweight to the welfare system. A hir-
ing subsidy targeted at the long-term unemployed has been championed by
Dennis Snower (1994). Wage subsidies were urged to counter the effects of
payroll taxes by Jacques Dre´ze and Edmond Malinvaud (1994). Christopher
Pissarides (1996) has studied the effects of such tax relief.
These analyses focus on the subsidies’ near-term effects. None of the pa-
pers expressly argues that there would be a permanent effect on unemploy-
ment. Some of the authors may have thought the effect was only temporary
but a way to buy valuable time. To study the long-term effects, however,
requires an intertemporal model in which workers accumulate wealth and
firms invest in capital of one or more kinds according to expectations of the
future and interest rates.
As a comparative exercise, the first section undertakes a neoclassical anal-
ysis of the effects in the steady state of a flat (constant) subsidy, financed by
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a proportional payroll tax on the equilibrium level of manhours supplied. We
show that wealth decumulation serves ultimately to eliminate the employ-
ment decline first brought by the tax and wealth accumulation operates to
eliminate all the employment gains brought by the subsidy. The employment
is ultimately neutral although the take-home wage is increased for low-wage
workers.
We then shift to the theory of the natural rate of unemployment. Using
our labor-turnover model, with its incentive wage, we study two employment
subsidies: a flat (constant) subsidy and a graduated subsidy that decreases
with the wage rate and vanishes asymptotically at the top—each program fi-
nanced by a flat-rate payroll tax (as if no reflow of budgetary savings and rev-
enue gains resulted). In this model (Phelps, 1968, 1994c; Hoon and Phelps,
1992), quitting by employees poses an incentive problem for the firm, since
it must invest in the firm-specific training of workers to make them function-
ing employees and such an investment is lost whenever an employee quits.
The problem prompts firms to drive up the going wage. This leads in turn
to involuntary unemployment in labor-market equilibrium. Our 1992 paper
posited worker-savers in overlapping cohorts to obtain a general-equilibrium
framework with which to endogenize the rate of interest or the accumulation
of net foreign assets. The present paper introduces a continuum of workers
differentiated by productivity in each cohort.
The gist of our findings can be indicated. Due to incentive-wage consid-
erations, the two schemes permanently expand employment in the long run.
The proportional payroll tax used to finance the subsidy is neutral for em-
ployment. With employment unchanged, the payroll tax lowers take-home
pay in the same proportion for every type of worker but nonwage income is
also reduced by the same proportion. As a result, the incentive-wage condi-
tion is invariant to the proportional payroll tax in the long run. The subsidy,
however, is nonneutral. If, before, a penny increase in hourly labor com-
pensation by the firm had a marginal benefit equal to marginal cost at the
original employment rate, it must now have a marginal benefit less than the
marginal cost as that additional penny now has a smaller impact on quitting.
Hence firms lower the incentive pay and as a result employment is expanded
throughout the distribution in the long run.
For low-wage workers, there is an added boost to employment in the short
run. Given net wealth and the interest rate, the higher take-home pay induces
a decline in the propensity to quit. The result is a rightward shift of the zero-
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profit curve and an additional rightward shift of the incentive-wage curve on
top of the wedge caused by the subsidy. In the long run, wealth accumulation
leads to a proportionate rise of nonwage income at given employment, thus
shifting back the zero-profit curve to its original position. The incentive-wage
curve also shifts leftward but only by enough to leave a wedge caused by the
subsidy. The net result, then, for low-wage workers is that the expansionary
effect on employment is even larger in the short run than in the long run.
The long-run question in the closed-economy case is the subsidies’ effect
on the rate of interest and the effect in turn on wages and employment. Here
we find that if the zero-profit curve is elastic, aggregate wealth supply is
increased, but it increases by less than the increase in asset demand. The
result is a rise in the rate of interest. However, for workers whose produc-
tivity levels are below or equal to the mean, employment is expanded; at
productivities far enough below the mean, take-home wages will rise.
It is also found that the graduated scheme, besides having (for the same
subsidy rate at the bottom) a lighter budgetary burden than the constant
subsidy, has an extra downward impact on hourly labor cost, as firms mod-
erate wage rates above the bottom to win a larger subsidy, with the result
that employment receives an extra boost. Such an effect raises the fear that
some middle-wage workers would see their wage reduced on balance. We
show, however, that unless the subsidy tapers off too fast no such wage effect
occurs. Finally, we show that the gross hiring rate is increased the most for
low-wage workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I analyzes the effects of a
flat (constant) subsidy in a neoclassical model. Section II presents the basic
features of the labor-turnover model with a continuum of workers exhibiting
constant marginal training cost. Section III studies the incidence of the
subsidies in the steady-state, general-equilibrium model of the small open
economy while Section IV analyzes the closed economy case. Section V briefly
discusses the case of rising marginal training cost in the small open economy
case. Section VI concludes.
I. Neoclassical Theory
We follow the treatment by Olivier Blanchard (1985) of finitely-lived
agents with no bequest in a one-sector setup. (See George Kanaginis and
Phelps, 1994 and Phelps, 1994c, chapter 16.) In each cohort, the workers
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form a continuum when ranked by their respective potential productivity
levels. The productivity, or ability, of worker input at location i in this con-
tinuum is measured by a labor-augmenting, hence Harrod-neutral, parameter
denoted Λi. There is a known and unvarying distribution of Λi in the working
population, which we normalize to one. The proportion of workers with pro-
ductivity level Λi or less is G(Λi) and the density function is g(Λi) = G
′(Λi).
We call a worker with productivity level Λi a type-i worker.
Each agent of type i derives utility from consumption and leisure, which
we assume are additively separable and take the log form. He has a finite life
and faces an instantaneous probability of death θ that is constant throughout
life. Solving the agent’s problem, and denoting aggregate variables by capital
letters, we obtain Ci = (θ+ ρ)[Hi+Wi] and (L¯−Li)/Ci = 1/vhi , where Ci is
consumption, Li is labor supply, Hi is human wealth, and Wi is nonhuman
wealth per member of the type-i workforce. Here ρ is the time preference
parameter, L¯ is total time available, and vhi is the real hourly household
wage received by a type-i worker, which is related to the hourly labor cost
to the firm of a type-i worker, vfi , by v
f
i ≡ (1 + τ)vhi − si, τ being the
proportional payroll tax rate. Under the flat subsidy scheme, si equals s
F,
a constant. Under a graduated subsidy scheme, si is a decreasing function
of the wage paid by the firm to each type-i worker, denoted si = S(v
f
i ), and
tapers off asymptotically. We impose throughout the conditions S ′(vfi ) < 0
and |S ′(vfi )| < 1.
In the small open economy, the path of the domestic interest rate conforms
to the exogenously given world interest rate, r∗: r = r∗, r∗ a constant > 0.
The level of net external assets adjusts endogenously to bring about this
condition. The steady-state Hi equals v
h
i Li/(r
∗ + θ) and nonwage income of
a type-i worker is given by ywi ≡ (r∗ + θ)Wi, θWi being actuarial dividend.
In the steady state, setting C˙i = 0, we also have r
∗ = ρ + [θ(θ + ρ)Wi/Ci].
This can be rewritten, after some substitutions, as
r∗ = ρ+
θ
1 + (
vhi L¯
ywi
)(Li
L¯
)
. (1)
The steady-state labor-supply relation in manhours can also be expressed as
Li
L¯
=
1− [ θ+ρ
r∗+θ ](
vhi L¯
ywi
)−1
1 + [ θ+ρ
r∗+θ ]
. (2)
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Turning to the production side, let the production function be written
as Y = [
∫∞
Λ ΛiLig(Λi)dΛi]f(K/
∫∞
Λ ΛiLig(Λi)dΛi), where Λ is the minimum
productivity level, and K is capital stock. Firms’ optimal choice of labor and
the capital-labor ratio, k ≡ (K/ ∫∞Λ ΛiLig(Λi)dΛi), imply
vfi
Λi
= f(k)− kf ′(k); (3)
r∗ = f ′(k). (4)
The given world interest rate, r∗, pins down the optimal capital-labor
ratio, k. Consequently, the wage paid by the firm, vfi , is pinned down, being
directly proportional to Λi. Observe that the wage-to-nonwage income ratio
in (1) is an implicit function of r∗ at each Li:
vhi L¯
ywi
= Υ(r∗ − ρ, Li
L¯
); Υ1 < 0, Υ2 < 0. (5)
Using this in (2), we obtain a reduced-form labor supply relation in the steady
state:
Li
L¯
=
1− [ θ+ρ
r∗+θ ][Υ(r
∗ − ρ, Li
L¯
)]−1
1 + [ θ+ρ
r∗+θ ]
. (6)
This equation uniquely determines the labor supply in manhours and is in-
dependent of the tax and subsidy rates. It is also independent of Λi.
To understand this result, we notice that the labor demand curve in the
(Li/L¯, v
f
i ) plane is infinitely elastic. With wealth and hence y
w
i given, the
labor supply schedule is upward sloping. Under a balanced-budget policy,
the flat subsidy case yields a convenient expression for the tax rate, namely,
τ = sF/vhmean, where v
h
mean ≡
∫∞
Λ v
h
i g(Λi)dΛi. For an employee whose Λi <
Λmean, the tax liability (τv
h
i ) is therefore less than the subsidy (s
F). Hence, at
given ywi , a low-wage worker increases his equilibrium labor supply. Wealth
accumulation then brings his ywi up until the original v
h
i /y
w
i is restored. On
the other hand, for an employee whose Λi > Λmean, his v
h
i is reduced. Such
a high-wage worker decumulates wealth until once again the original vhi /y
w
i
is restored. Thus, in the long run, the tax-subsidy scheme is neutral for
employment for all workers throughout the distribution. A similiar argument
holds for the graduated subsidy scheme.
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In the closed-economy case, the essential task is to endogenize the rate of
interest. One approach to the problem is to work toward a diagram involv-
ing an asset demand curve and a wealth supply schedule, the intersection
giving us the general-equilibrium rate of interest. Using the following two
conditions:
r = ρ+
θ
1 + (
vhi L¯
ywi
)
, (7)
Li
L¯
=
1− [ θ+ρ
r+θ
](
vhi L¯
ywi
)−1
1 + [ θ+ρ
r+θ
]
, (8)
we prove in the Appendix that we can write Li/L¯ as a decreasing function
of r, given ρ and θ, that is,
Li
L¯
= ψ(r; ρ, θ); ψ′(r) < 0. (9)
Using the firm’s optimal condition r = f ′(k) and (9), the aggregate asset
demand given by
A = k
∫ ∞
Λ
ΛiL¯ψ(r)g(Λi)dΛi (10)
is decreasing in r.
The average supply of wealth per member of the type-i workforce is ob-
tained by substituting ywi ≡ (r + θ)Wi in (7):
Wi = [
(vhi L¯)(
Li
L¯
)
r + θ
][
r − ρ
θ + ρ− r ]. (11)
Excluding the case where r − ρ > θ, we have a well-defined steady state
with the righthand side of (11) being unambiguously positive. Observe that
the first bracketed term in (11) is simply human wealth per type-i worker,
and for a given after-tax real wage (vhi Li), human wealth, Hi, is decreasing
in r. On this account, Wi falls as r rises. On the other hand, a rise of r has a
positive effect on Wi on account of the second bracketed term, Wi/Hi. The
total supply of wealth per worker is given by W ≡ ∫∞Λ Wig(Λi)dΛi. Using
(11), we obtain
W = [
r − ρ
(θ + ρ− r)(r + θ) ]
∫ ∞
Λ
vhi Lig(Λi)dΛi.
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Under a balanced-budget, we get
W = [
r − ρ
(θ + ρ− r)(r + θ) ]
∫ ∞
Λ
vfi Lig(Λi)dΛi. (12)
Using (vf/Λi) = f(k) − kf ′(k) and (9), and noting that k is a decreasing
function of r, we obtain an expression of total wealth supply as a function of
the rate of interest:
W = [
r − ρ
(θ + ρ− r)(r + θ) ]
∫ ∞
Λ
[f(k)− kf ′(k)]ψ(r)L¯Λig(Λi)dΛi. (13)
What is the shape of the supply of wealth? There are two opposing forces.
In the general equilibrium, an increase of r lowers the real wage as well as the
supply of manhours; and, as remarked above, it lowers the present value of
these expected earnings. So human wealth is reduced. However, the second
braketed term in (11) works to increase desired supply of wealth as r rises. At
r sufficiently low thatWi is at or near zero, the former effects are outweighed
by the latter though at sufficiently high r the opposite may occur. Hence the
per worker supply of wealth schedule is upward-sloping initially but at very
high r may bend backward. In the same plane, per worker demand for the
domestic assets is downward-sloping. We will suppose that the equilibrium
r is unique or that only the lowest equilibrium r is empirically relevant.
(See Figure 1.) The important thing to observe from (10) and (13) is that
the pair of equations are independent of the tax-subsidy parameters. Hence
the balanced-budget tax-subsidy policy is neutral for the rate of interest,
and, consequently, also neutral for employment.1 Nevertheless, for low-wage
workers, their take-home pay is increased.
II. Basic Features of the Economy in Modern-Equilibrium Theory
The preceding neoclassical theory has difficulty explaining why, under
plausible assumptions, the policy shift and other aggregate shocks experi-
enced in recent decades should cause large changes in equilibrium labor input
1Another way to see that the policy is neutral for the rate of interest is to use the
requirement that aggregate supply be equal to aggregate demand. Equating the ag-
gregate demand to aggregate supply in the equation, (r − ρ) ∫∞
Λ
Cig(Λi)dΛi = θ(θ +
ρ)
∫∞
Λ
Wig(Λi)dΛi, we obtain, r = ρ+ [θ(θ+ ρ)k/f(k)], which, noting that k is decreasing
in r, determines the general-equilibrium r independently of the tax-subsidy parameters.
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and national income. The theory does not allow for unemployment; rather
changes in labor input are attributable entirely to variations in the work
week.
To study the effects of the tax-subsidy schemes on the equilibrium path
of unemployment, we need to draw on modern-equilibrium theory, which sees
unemployment as structural in nature and traces its vicissitudes to changes
in the structure of the economy (Phelps, 1994c). At the center of this theory
is the relationship between the firm and the employee arising from their
incentives in the modern setting of asymmetric information. The economics
of incentive (or efficiency) wages plays a key role in generating involuntary
unemployment and shaping its equilibrium path.
There are many identical firms. For convenience we may think of them in
fixed number (normalized to one) and equal in size. Consider the represen-
tative firm j. Its problem is to choose the wage and hiring-training policies
that maximize∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Λ
Njit{Λi[1− βhjit]− vfjit}g(Λi)e−
∫ t
0
rνdνdΛidt,
which is the present value of the stream of real quasirents, subject to
N˙jit = Njit[hjit − ζ(z
he
it
vhjit
,
ywit
vhjit
)− θ]
and given Nji0. Note that si is implicit in v
h
ji and v
f
ji, given τ . (Since to
simplify we will initially work with constant marginal training cost, we also
assume that hjit is bounded, 0 ≤ hjit ≤ h¯.) Here, Njit is the stock of type-i
employees at the representative firm j taken as a ratio to the type-i workforce
(equivalently, the rate of employment among type-i workers), βhjit is the
fraction of their working time type-i employees devote to training new hires,
hjit is the gross hiring rate of new type-i recruits, ζ similiarly measured is
the quit rate, and zheit is a proxy for the expected value of real wage earnings
of a type-i worker employed at firm j if he quits.2
2The quit rate function has the following first derivatives: ζ1 > 0 and ζ2 > 0. By
virtue of the firm’s second-order condition for maximization, ζ11 > 0 and ζ22 > 0. We also
make the assumption that an increase in the nonwage income raises a worker’s marginal
propensity to quit with respect to wage prospects elsewhere, that is, ζ12 > 0.
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We may write the current-value Hamiltonian as∫ ∞
Λ
{Λi[1− βhjit]− vfjit + qjit[hjit − ζ(zheit /vhjit, ywit/vhjit)− θ]}Njitg(Λi)dΛi,
where qjit is the co-state variable.
3 It measures the shadow value of a type-
i worker after training by the employer. First-order necessary conditions
(which are also sufficient under our assumptions) are given by
hjit = h¯ if qjit > Λiβ;
hjit = 0 if qjit < Λiβ;
hjit ∈ [0, h¯] if qjit = Λiβ;
 (14)
Njit{−1 + qjit[(z
he
it
vh2jit
)ζ1 + (
ywit
vh2jit
)ζ2]
dvhjit
dvfjit
} = 0; (15)
q˙jit − rtqjit = −{Λi − vfjit − qjit[ζ(
zheit
vhjit
,
ywit
vhjit
) + θ]}; (16)
lim
t→∞ exp
−
∫ t
0
rνdν qjitNjitg(Λi) = 0. (17)
The equations represented by (14) characterize the optimal number of new
hires. In the case arising in the steady-state analysis below, the shadow value
of a trained worker is equal to the marginal training cost in output terms.
Equation (15) gives the optimal real wage-turnover cost trade-off, equating
the marginal cost of raising vfi to the marginal benefit. Equation (16) relates
the shadow value of functional employees to the total marginal benefit of
having one more employee. The transversality condition is in (17). These
equations summarize the conditions that have to be satisfied for the typical
firm.
To move to the equilibrium conditions, we use the Salop-Calvo approx-
imation for zheit , namely, z
he
it = N
e
itv
he
it . (Using the exit rate from the un-
employment pool would not differ in the steady state.) On any equilib-
rium (correct-expectations) path with identical firms, vhjit = v
h
it = v
he
it and
Njit = 1 − uit ≡ Nit = N eit. Hence we obtain a subsystem of equations in
3The flow of output at firm j is then given by
∫∞
Λ
Λi[1− βhjit]Njitg(Λi)dΛi.
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the equilibrium path of the economy. For any exogenously given path of the
instantaneous real interest rates, this subsystem is
q˙it = qit[ζ(Nit,
ywit
vhit
) + θ + rt]− [Λi − vfit]; (18)
N˙it = Nit[hit − ζ(Nit, y
w
it
vhit
)− θ]; (19)
Nit{−1 + qit[(Nit
vhit
)ζ1 + (
ywit
vh2it
)ζ2]
dvhit
dvfit
} = 0. (20)
III. Open-Economy Incidence of Tax-Subsidy Schemes
In steady state, N˙it = 0. This and (19) give the steady-state employment
(SSE) condition that hires balance quits and mortality:
hi = ζ(Nit,
ywit
vhit
) + θ. (21)
This implies that qi = Λiβ.
With q˙it = 0 in (18) and qi = Λiβ, the zero-profit (ZP) condition that
quasirents cover interest and depreciation on training becomes
vfi
Λi
= 1− β[ζ(Ni, y
w
i
vhi
) + θ + r∗], (22)
where r∗ is substituted for the domestic interest rate. Since quitting is in-
creasing in Ni and y
w
i , the zero-profit wage must be decreasing in those
variables.
Assuming that the employment rate is always strictly positive, we obtain
from (20) the incentive-wage (IW) condition that gives the incentive-pay level
minimizing cost. The cost per employee of paying a penny more in annual
wages is one. The cost saving, or benefit, per employee of doing so is the
opportunity cost of replacing each defector, βΛi, times the number of annual
quits per employee that would be saved. Equating these two gives
1 = βΛi[Niζ1 + (
ywi
vhi
)ζ2][(
1
vhi
)(
dvhi
dvfi
)]. (23)
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The flat (constant) subsidy case gives
1 = βΛi[Niζ1 + (
ywi
vhi
)ζ2][
1
1+τ
vfi +s
F
1+τ
]
= βΛi[Niζ1 + (
ywi
vhi
)ζ2][
1
vfi + s
F
], (24)
since dvhi /dv
f
i ≡ 1/(1 + τ) and vhi ≡ (vfi + sF)/(1 + τ), while the graduated
subsidy case gives
1 = βΛi[Niζ1 + (
ywi
vhi
)ζ2][
1 + S ′(vfi )
vfi + S(v
f
i )
]. (25)
Notice that (25) can be satisfied as an equality only if |S ′(vfi )| < 1. If
|S ′(vfi )| > 1, each firm would find it profitable to drive the wage all the way
down in order to gain a higher subsidy.
The third general-equilibrium condition arises from the firms’ assets.
The assets are the investments in their employees, the ownership claims to
which—the equity shares—generate nonwage income and have an equilib-
rium value. As before, we use the Blanchard-Yaari setup to generate, in
steady state, the equation:
r∗ = ρ+
θ
1 + (
vhi
ywi
)Ni
. (26)
This condition makes the nonwage-income-to-wage ratio an implicit function
of the unemployment rate and of the interest rate:
ywi
vhi
= Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni), Ω1 > 0,Ω2 > 0. (27)
Long-Run Effects of the Flat Subsidy
Substituting (27) into (22) and (24) gives the reduced-form system in the
flat-subsidy case:
vfi
Λi
= 1− β[ζ(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni)) + θ + r∗], (28)
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vfi
Λi
+
sF
Λi
= β[Niζ1(Ni,Ω(r
∗ − ρ,Ni))
+Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni)ζ2(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni))]. (29)
Suppose that initially the ad valorem payroll tax rate is zero and the
subsidy is also zero. Equation (28) can be represented as a downward-sloping
zero-profit schedule while (29) can be depicted as an upward-sloping wage
curve in the Marshallian plane shown in Figure 2. Examining (26), and
recalling that in the absence of the tax-subsidy scheme vhi ≡ vfi , notice that
we can also draw a family of hyperbolas in Figure 1 with each hyperbola
lying north-east corresponding to a higher level of ywi . Note also that when
the ZP curve cuts the hyperbola from below, as we have drawn in Figure
2, the labor-cost elasticity of labor demand is implied to exceed one. (In
that case, as we shall see, the proportionate increase of Ni effected by the
subsidy exceeds the proportionate decrease of vfi /Λi that the increased Ni
induces so that, on balance, the product (vfi /Λi)Ni is up.) The algebraic
slope of the zero-profit curve is given by −β[ζ1+ ζ2Ω2], which, in the absence
of any other factors leading to diminishing returns to labor, depends only on
the sensitivity of the quit function to the economy-wide rate of employment
(or unemployment). The zero-profit curve slopes downward both because a
lower rate of unemployment implies a tighter labor market, which induces
higher quits, and because it implies a higher nonwage income-to-wage ratio,
which also raises the propensity to quit. For the United States over the
period 1931-62, Eagly (1965) obtains an estimate of the elasticity of the quit
rate with respect to the unemployment rate that is equal to -0.634.4 If we
accept that, in the equilibrium steady-state scenario we are considering, the
quit rate does not vary much with movements in the employment rate, the
zero-profit curve will be somewhat flat, that is, the labor-cost elasticity of the
zero-profit curve will be high. We also notice that the same diagram (Figure
2) represents the equilibrium for every type-i worker. The employment rate,
4Looking at the effects of wage differentials on quits, Alan Krueger and Lawrence
Summers (1988, p.280) find that “at the mean the elasticity of quits with respect to the
wage premium is −.07/.26 = −.27.” They reason that taken together, “these results imply
that a 10 per cent increase in the wage differential brings about a .3 per cent increase in
output through reduced quits alone. This suggests that although turnover does adversely
affect output, reductions in turnover alone are not sufficient to justify wage premiums of
the magnitude actually observed unless fixed costs of hiring are very high or labor’s share
in output is very low.”
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Ni, real effective wage, v
f
i /Λi, and the nonwage income taken as a ratio to
productivity level, ywi /Λi, are the same for every type-i worker so the real
wage, vfi , is twice as high for a worker who is twice as productive as another
worker.5 The nonwage income, ywi , corresponding to the hyperbola passing
through E0 is also twice as high for a worker who is twice as productive as
another worker.
Consider now the long-run employment effects of a flat (constant) subsidy.
The derivative of Ni with respect to s
F is calculated to be
dNi
dsF
=
Λ−1i
β[2(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2) +Ni(ζ11 + ζ12Ω2) + Ω(ζ21 + ζ22Ω2)]
> 0 (30)
for every type i. The argument that this inequality is unambiguously positive
is the following: Assume that there was no change in unemployment so that
we were at an unchanged point (Ni, v
f
i ) on the zero-profit curve so firms have
returned to the original point that they were at before. The proportional
payroll tax, taken by itself, has two effects. First, a penny increase in vfi
increases vhi by only a fraction of a penny, namely, 1/(1+ τ). This lowers the
marginal benefit of a penny increase in vfi . Second, the proportional payroll
tax lowers vhi and, under correct expectations, v
he
i , in the same proportion
for every type i. With the employment rate unchanged, ywi would also be
reduced by the same proportion. Then each additional penny received by an
employee now has a greater impact on vhi taken as a ratio to expected real
wage earnings elsewhere and taken as a ratio to nonwage income so that the
salutary effect on quitting is increased. Through this channel the marginal
benefit of a penny increase in vfi is increased. If, instead of financing the
subsidy, the proceeds from the payroll tax were, say, thrown into the sea, the
two effects would exactly cancel out, leaving employment unaffected. There
is, however, a third effect arising from the presence of the constant subsidy. In
the presence of the subsidy, an additional penny received by an employee has
a smaller impact on vhi /v
he
i and v
h
i /y
w
i so that the salutary effect on quitting is
5The equalization of unemployment rate result depends on the assumption that the
marginal training cost in manhours, β, is the same across all types of workers. If we have
βi > βj , then it can be shown that the unemployment rate for type-i workers will be higher
than that for type-j workers. Note that this assumption is consistent with Λiβi < Λjβj ,
that is, although the marginal training cost for type-i workers is higher when measured
in manhours, it could be lower when measured in terms of output on account of its lower
productivity.
14
reduced. In the general equilibrium involving correct expectations and long-
run capital market equilibrium, the incentive-wage condition can be written
as
1 = βΛi[Niζ1 + Ω(r
∗ − ρ,Ni)ζ2][
1
1+τ
vfi +s
F
1+τ
].
We can see from the righthand side of this equation that the two effects
arising from the presence of (1 + τ) exactly cancel out. This implies that in
the long run, after wealth has fully adjusted, the payroll tax is neutral for
employment. It follows that if a penny increase in vfi had a marginal benefit
equal to marginal cost at the original employment rate, it must now have a
marginal benefit less than the marginal cost. Hence firms cut their vfi and
employment is expanded as a result.
We can see that, with the same dollar amount of wage subsidy given to
each type-i worker, a less productive worker enjoys a higher subsidy relative
to his productivity level. In Figure 3 we show that the employment effect is
larger for a less productive worker as his wage curve is shifted further down
than that of a more productive worker.
Consider now the long-run wage effects of the flat subsidy. We note that
under a balanced-budget policy, the following relationship holds:∫ ∞
Λ
sFNig(Λi)dΛi =
∫ ∞
Λ
τvhi Nig(Λi)dΛi.
As noted earlier, around an equilibrium with no tax-subsidy, Ni, is equal for
every type i. It follows that the budget constraint can be simplified to τ =
sF/vhmean, where v
h
mean ≡
∫∞
Λ v
h
i g(Λi)dΛi. Using this, and noting that around a
zero-tax-subsidy equilibrium, (vhi /v
h
mean) = (Λi/Λ mean), it is straightforward
to show that
dvhi
dsF
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
ηZP
ηZP + ηIW
− Λi
Λmean
, (31)
where ηZP and ηIW are the elasticities of the zero-profit and wage curves,
respectively. For a worker whose Λi is sufficiently low, say Λi → Λ →
0, the derivative of vhi with respect to s
F is unambiguously positive. But
employment is expanded everywhere.
Short-Run Effects of the Flat Subsidy
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Consider now briefly the short run in which wealth and ywi are given. Here
the subsidy provides an additional boost to employment. With net wealth
and interest unchanged, the increased take-home pay leads a worker to value
his job more highly. This has the effect, at any employment rate, of raising
the firm’s real demand wage as the propensity to quit is reduced. Around
a zero-tax-subsidy equilibrium, the vertical shift of the iso-ywi ZP curve is
given by
dvfi
dsF
∣∣∣∣∣
ZP
=
βΛiζ2(
ywi
vh2i
)[1− Λi
Λmean
]
1− βΛiζ2( y
w
i
vh2i
)
,
which is positive for any worker whose productivity is below the mean.6
The decreased propensity to quit on account of the reduced nonwage income
relative to wage ratio also has the effect of shifting down the incentive-wage
curve that is on top of the shift due to the wedge caused by the subsidy. The
vertical shift of the iso-ywi IW curve is given by
dvfi
dsF
∣∣∣∣∣
IW
=
−1− βΛi( y
w
i
vh2i
)[ζ2 +Niζ12 + (
ywi
vhi
)ζ22][1− ΛiΛmean ]
1 + βΛi(
ywi
vh2i
)[ζ2 +Niζ12 + (
ywi
vhi
)ζ22]
,
which is unambiguously negative for a worker whose productivity level is
below the mean. From (26), we see that at given Ni, the nonwage income, y
w
i ,
is increased by the same proportion as the rise in vhi for the low-wage worker.
Hence, in the long run, wealth accumulation ultimately shifts back the ZP
curve to its original position and the IW curve also shifts up as wealth catches
up to the increased take-home pay. However, a wedge remains, implying that
employment is expanded throughout the distribution in the long run as shown
earlier. For low-wage workers, there is an additional boost to employment in
the short run.
Long-Run Effects of the Graduated Subsidy
Now the graduated subsidy: Equation (29) is replaced by
vfi + S(v
f
i )
Λi[1 + S ′(v
f
i )]
= β[Niζ1(Ni,Ω(r
∗ − ρ,Ni))
+Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni)ζ2(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni))]. (32)
6Around a zero-tax-subsidy equilibrium, 1− βΛiζ2( y
w
i
vh2
i
) = βΛiNi/vhi > 0.
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Around a zero-tax-subsidy equilibrium, the response of Ni to a small change
in s∗ ≡ S(vf∗i ) is then calculated to be
dNi
ds∗
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
Λ−1i + Λ
−1
i { [v
f∗
i S
′′/(1+S′)]η˜IW
(1−[vf∗i S′′/(1+S′)])η˜IW+ηZP
}
(1 + S ′)β[(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2) +Ni(ζ11 + ζ12Ω2) + Ω(ζ21 + ζ22Ω2)] + β[ζ1 + ζ2Ω2]
,
(33)
where
η˜IW =
Λiβ[(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2) +Ni(ζ11 + ζ12Ω2) + Ω(ζ21 + ζ22Ω2)]Ni
vfi
1+S′
> 0.
Expressing ηIW ≡ {(1+S ′)− [vfi S ′′/(1+S ′)]}η˜IW, the condition that the wage
curve be positively sloped in the (Ni, v
f
i ) plane is that S
′′ < (1 + S ′)2/vfi .
Given the restriction that |S ′(vfi )| < 1, a sufficient condition for a graduated
subsidy scheme paying s∗ = sF to give an extra boost to employment is
therefore that 0 < S ′′ < (1 + S ′)2/vfi . With graduation, there are two
effects that are at work when compared to the constant subsidy case as
shown in Figure 4. Firstly, with graduation firms are induced to moderate
wage rates above the bottom in order to gain a larger subsidy. For s∗ =
sF, Figure 4 shows that the wage curve is shifted further down under a
graduated scheme. Secondly, graduation changes the slope of the wage curve.
Whereas a constant subsidy scheme has no effect on the slope of the wage
curve (there being a parallel shift), the new wage curve becomes steeper at
higher wages with a graduated scheme. The restriction on S ′′ is sufficient to
ensure that the “shift” as well as the “slope” effects of graduation leave a
bigger boost to employment compared to the constant subsidy case. Note also
that by designing a subsidy plan such that the subsidy asymptotically reaches
zero as vfi is increased, we ensure that employment is raised throughout the
distribution although the expansionary effect is smaller at higher vfi .
Consider now the long-run wage effects. We can show that around a
zero-tax-subsidy equilibrium, the following derivative holds:
dvhi
ds∗
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
= { ηZP − [
vf∗i S
′′
1+S′ ]η˜IW
(1− [vf∗i S′′
1+S′ ])η˜IW + ηZP
} − [ Λi
Λmean
][
dS
ds∗
], (34)
where S ≡ ∫∞Λ S(vfi )g(Λi)dΛi and dS/ds∗ > 0. If we further restrict the
value of S ′′ such that 0 < S ′′ < (1 + S ′)2/vfi − (ηIW/ηZP)(1 + S ′)/vfi , the first
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curly brace term in (34) is unambiguously positive. Notice from (33) that
employment is increasing in S ′′. If we strike a balance in our choice of S ′′
with regard to the extra expansionary employment effect on the one hand
and the wage effect on the other hand, we can obtain a higher take-home
wage for a worker whose Λi is sufficiently low along with higher employment.
Long-Run Effects of a Hiring Subsidy
Before concluding our analysis of the small open economy, let us examine
the effects of a hiring subsidy in our model. Suppose that an ad valorem
payroll tax is used to finance a flat hiring subsidy of sHF for each new recruit
hired. It is straightforward to show that our two fundamental equations
giving the reduced-form ZP and IW schedules become, respectively,
vfi
Λi
= 1− [β − s
HF
Λi
]
×[ζ(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni)) + r∗ + θ]; (35)
vfi
Λi
= [β − s
HF
Λi
] (36)
×[Niζ1(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni)) + Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni)ζ(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni))].
Such a policy shifts up the ZP curve but shifts down the IW curve leading
to an unambiguous expansion of equilibrium employment but possible decline
of the product wage, vfi . (In contrast, under both the flat and graduated
subsidy plans, the before-tax wage of the workers, vfi + si, unambiguously
rises.) The take-home wage would accordingly fall further as the payroll tax
is applied though this must be set against the subsidy that each new recruit
receives when hired. We obtain the following derivative7:
d[vfi /(1 + τ) + (r
∗ + θ)sHF]
dsHF
∣∣∣∣∣
sHF=0
= (ζ+θ)[µ−( Λi
Λmean
)]+(1+µ)r∗+θ−(1−µ)[Niζ1+Ωζ2],
where
0 < µ ≡ (ζ1 + ζ2Ω2) + (ζ11 + ζ12Ω2)Ni + (ζ21 + ζ22Ω2)Ω
2(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2) + (ζ11 + ζ12Ω2)Ni + (ζ21 + ζ22Ω2)Ω
< 1.
7The balanced-budget condition with a hiring subsidy simplifies to τ = [(ζ +
θ)sHF/vhmean] around a zero-hiring-subsidy equilibrium, noting that in the steady state,
the hiring rate equals ζ + θ for every type of worker.
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IV. Closed-Economy Incidence
We confine our analysis to a flat subsidy in the closed economy financed
by a proportional payroll tax. For any r, our reduced form ZP and IW curves
are written respectively as
vfi
Λi
= 1− β[ζ(Ni,Ω(r − ρ,Ni)) + θ + r], (37)
vfi
Λi
+
sF
Λi
= β[Niζ1(Ni,Ω(r − ρ,Ni))
+Ω(r − ρ,Ni)ζ2(Ni,Ω(r − ρ,Ni))], (38)
where we have again substituted for ywi /v
h
i the function Ω(r−ρ,Ni) obtained
from the Blanchardian relationship expressed as
r = ρ+
θ
1 + (vhi /y
w
i )Ni
. (39)
We note from (37) and (38) that by equating the required incentive wage
to the demand wage, we can express the employment rate of any type-i
worker as an implicit function of the interest rate and the subsidy relative to
productivity level, namely,
Ni = ²(r; (s
F/Λi)); ²1 < 0; ²2 > 0. (40)
The function ² is interpretable as the demand for the stock of employees in
steady state. The value of the total stock of employees, which are the only
form of asset in the closed economy, is A ≡ ∫∞Λ βΛiNig(Λi)dΛi since each
employee is worth βΛi. By (40), A is a decreasing function of the rate of
interest:
A =
∫ ∞
Λ
βΛi²(r; (s
F/Λi))g(Λi)dΛi. (41)
An expression for the average supply of wealth per member of the type-i
workforce is obtained from (39) as
Wi = (
vhi Ni
r + θ
)[
r − ρ
θ + ρ− r ]. (42)
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As before, excluding the case where r− ρ > θ, we have a well-defined steady
state with the righthand side of (42) being unambiguously positive. The
total supply of wealth per worker, under balanced budget, is given by
W = [
r − ρ
(θ + ρ− r)(r + θ) ]
∫ ∞
Λ
vfi Nig(Λi)dΛi. (43)
Further using (37) and (40) in (43), we obtain an expression giving us total
desired supply of wealth as a function of the rate of interest:
W = [
r − ρ
(θ + ρ− r)(r + θ) ] (44)
×
∫ ∞
Λ
{1− β[ζ(²(r; s
F
Λi
),Ω(r − ρ, ²(r; s
F
Λi
)) + r + θ]}²(r; s
F
Λi
)Λig(Λi)dΛi.
Suppose that initially the subsidy and payroll tax are zero. In that case,
we note from (37) and (38) that setting sF = 0 implies that Ni and y
w
i /v
h
i
are equal across all types of workers. Consequently, the quit rate is ini-
tially identical across all types of workers. As in our earlier discussion in
the neoclassical case, we can argue that the per worker supply of wealth is
upward-sloping initially but at very high r may bend backward as in Figure
1.8 In the same plane, per worker demand for the domestic assets in value
terms is downward sloping. We suppose that the equilibrium r is unique or
that only the lowest equilibrium r is empirically relevant.
To see how the tax-subsidy policy affects the rate of interest, it will help
to have a sharper characterization of this equilibrium. Since the quit rate
is equal across all types of workers in the neighborhood of the zero-subsidy
equilibrium, we can simplify the equilibrium condition to
W ≡ [ r − ρ
(θ + ρ− r)(r + θ) ]
×{1− β[ζ(²(r; s
F
Λi
),Ω(r − ρ, ²(r; s
F
Λi
)) + r + θ]}
∫ ∞
Λ
²(r;
sF
Λi
)Λig(Λi)dΛi
= β
∫ ∞
Λ
²(r;
sF
Λi
)Λig(Λi)dΛi ≡ A. (45)
8Although the increase in r leads to a decline in the real demand wage, the fall in Ni
acts to lower the quit propensity and hence indirectly acts to offset the fall in wage. We
assume that the direct effect dominates.
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The equilibrium r is therefore given by
[
r − ρ
(θ + ρ− r)(r + θ) ]
×{1− β[ζ(²(r; s
F
Λi
),Ω(r − ρ, ²(r; s
F
Λi
)) + r + θ]} = β. (46)
Thus we see that a tax-subsidy policy involving a small change in sF financed
by a proportional payroll tax has ultimately an influence on the interest
rate only via its influence on the quit rate. The effects of introducing a
small subsidy are as follows: At the original r, the subsidy, in expanding
the demand for employees of all types, shifts the domestic asset demand
schedule in Figure 1 to the right. (See the righthand side of (45).) As
workers, finding the probability of obtaining employment improved, step up
their saving accordingly, the supply of wealth schedule is also shifted to the
right. (See the lefthand side of (45).) In fact, both rightward shifts are
equal in magnitude, leaving the interest rate unchanged. But the rise in each
Ni acts to tighten the labor market of each type-i worker. The resulting
increase in the propensity to quit reduces the demand wage. This leads to
a leftward shift of the supply of wealth schedule causing the interest rate to
rise.9 (When the zero profit curve is horizontal, however, this effect would be
zero.) But clearly this effect can only moderate the net expansionary effect
on employment of low-Λi workers. To show this we may calculate the total
derivative of ²(r; (sF/Λi)) evaluated at a low Λi with respect to s
F.
Taking the total derivative in (45), we obtain
dr
dsF
=
(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)²2
{[ θ(θ+ρ)
(r−ρ)2 − ζ2Ω1]− (ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)²1}Λmean
. (47)
In the Appendix, we show that a necessary condition for the aggregate supply
of wealth schedule to be positively sloped under the proviso that the labor-
cost elasticity of the zero-profit curve exceeds unity is that [θ(θ+ρ)/(r−ρ)2] >
9In the Appendix, we calculate the extent of the horizontal shifts of the total supply of
wealth and total asset demand schedules. When the labor cost elasticity of the zero-profit
curve is greater than one, the net shift of the total supply of wealth schedule is rightward.
When this elasticity is less than one, the net shift is leftward.
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ζ2Ω1.
10 Hence the tax-subsidy scheme raises the rate of interest. To prove
that for low-Λi workers, the rise of r only moderates but does not overturn the
expansionary employment effect of sF, we calculate the following derivative:
dNi
dsF
= ²1(
dr
dsF
) +
²2
Λi
=
−(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)²1²2(Λ−1i − Λ−1mean) + [ θ(θ+ρ)(r−ρ)2 − ζ2Ω1]²2Λ−1i
{[ θ(θ+ρ)
(r−ρ)2 − ζ2Ω1]− (ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)²1}Λmean
. (48)
In the homogeneous case, the tax-subsidy scheme unambiguously expands
employment for everyone. In the heterogeneous case, all workers whose Λi
is either below or equal to the mean find their employment expanded. It is
straightforward to obtain an expression for the derivative of vhi with respect
to sF:
dvhi
dsF
∣∣∣∣∣
sF=0
= 1− Λi
Λmean
− Λiβ[(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)dNi
dsF
+ ζ2Ω1
dr
dsF
]. (49)
We see that for a worker whose Λi is sufficiently low, his v
h
i will rise as well.
V. The Case of Rising Marginal Training Cost
We will confine our discussion here only to the case of the small open econ-
omy. Suppose that the fraction of a type-i employee’s working time devoted
to training new hires is given by Φ(hi), where Φ
′(hi) > 0 and Φ′′(hi) > 0.
Solving the Hamiltonian problem, we would have qi = ΛiΦ
′(hi). With a flat
(constant) subsidy, the two fundamental reduced-form ZP and IW relation-
ships would now be given by
vfi
Λi
= 1− Φ(h) + hΦ′(h)− Φ′(hi)[ζ(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni)) + θ + r∗], (50)
10The inequality could (but need not necessarily) be reversed when the labor cost elas-
ticity of the zero-profit curve is less than one. If the inequality is reversed but the aggregate
supply of wealth schedule remains positively sloped, there is an increased upward pres-
sure on the interest rate. If the inequality is reversed and the aggregate supply of wealth
becomes negatively sloped, there is the theoretical possibility that the rate of interest is
lowered as a result of the tax-subsidy scheme. In such a case, employment is unambigu-
ously expanded for workers of all types.
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vfi
Λi
+
sF
Λi
= Φ′(hi)[Niζ1(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni))
+Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni)ζ2(Ni,Ω(r∗ − ρ,Ni))]. (51)
The steady-state employment (SSE) condition is that
hi = ζ(Ni,Ω(r
∗ − ρ,Ni)) + θ. (52)
From (51), we note that vfi /Λi is positively related to hi and Ni and
negatively related to sF/Λi, written v
f
i /Λi = V (hi, Ni; s
F/Λi). Using this
relation in (50), we obtain a downward-sloping schedule in the (Ni, hi) plane.
Equation (52), on the other hand, gives us a positively-sloped schedule. (See
Figure 5.) Starting from a zero-subsidy equilibrium, it is now clear that the
implementation of the flat subsidy scheme results in a rightward, and hence
upward, shift of the ZP curve in this plane. The result is that employment
is expanded along with a rise in steady-state hiring. Moreover, for the same
dollar amount of subsidy, the expansion is greatest for low-wage workers.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The pay open to the less advantaged is now so inadequate for meaning-
ful self-suppport and their participation rates and job attachment, especially
among men, are now so far from integrating poor communities in the nation’s
business life that, arguably, any remedy will require novel intervention. (If
the goal is not far, just raising the level of familiar instruments may suffice
to reattain it, but if the goal is far, designing de nuovo a more tailored in-
strument may be cheaper.) Any such innovation, however, may open the law
of unintended consequences, since we do not know the scale and perhaps the
nature of all the effects. This uncertainty leads to hesitation and disagree-
ment over the intervention to select. An investment in education that would
hypothetically restore low-end wages to their late-1970s level has been cal-
culated to cost nearly two trillion dollars (Heckman, 1993). But the radical
uncertainty over exactly what education reforms and expenditures to make
may be a bigger drawback (along with the needed one-generation lead-time).
The employment subsidy instrument has the advantage that economists
are familiar with the workings of corrrective taxes and subsidies—but mainly
at the partial-equilibrium level of the individual industry. Massive and per-
haps permanent low-wage employment subsidies would not likely prove an
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exception to the law of unanticipated effects. This paper has been addressed
to the doubts over such subsidies that might arise at the level of general
equilibrium. Is it theoretically possible in the context of our model of the
natural rate that the rise of the wage rate relative to nonwage income initially
achieved by the subsidies—recall that the increased payroll tax rate is ulti-
mately neutral for that ratio—will induce worker-savers to build up nonwage
income relative to the wage rate until incentive wages have been driven up
and the demand-wage rate driven down by enough to nullify the expansion of
employment? As the paper has shown, the adjustment of wealth in the small
open economy does act to moderate the expansion of employment achieved
by the subsidies in the “short run” but in the long run employment is in-
creased throughout the distribution. In the closed-economy case, the interest
rate is pulled up, which moderates employment expansion. Nevertheless, em-
ployment unambiguously expands for all workers whose productivity level is
below the mean.
Other uncertainties must be left for future work. One of these, obvi-
ously, is the net budgetary cost of wage subsidies. In principle, employment
subsidies could be targeted on groups who, if their employment were not
subsidized, would otherwise cost the government as much or more in public
support—single parents, generally mothers, with dependent children, for ex-
ample. In America, however, it may be the increased difficulty of self-support
and the increased disengagement from business life among men that is fun-
damental, since that may lie behind the rise of single-parenting as well as the
rise of crime, violence and drug abuse. And men are not as eligible as women
for most welfare outlays. So employment subsidies had better be untargeted.
And the argument that their net budgetary cost will be small enough to sat-
isfy taxpayers has to rest on estimates of the indirect savings and revenues
achieved when entire poor communities are made self-supporting through
work: the savings in welfare, crime prevention, administration of justice,
unemployment compensation and other social insurance programs (under
existing benefit schedules), and the revenues from the additional collection
of income and sales taxes (under existing rates).
An attractive feature of hiring subsidies is that they can be targeted at
those potential workers currently depending on unemployment compensation
or welfare benefits for their support. So the budgetary savings achieved by
stimulating their employment may equal or exceed the gross budgetary outlay
for the subsidies. This feature has been used by Dennis Snower in designing
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a program whereby the unemployed worker creates his own hiring subsidy
by trading in his unemployment benefits in return for a job. We found,
however, that subsidies to hiring might actually reduce wage rates at the low
end, perhaps, appreciably so, and this would be a serious drawback in the
American context where, among the disadvantaged, low wages are as much in
need of remedying as depressed employment. Furthermore, jobless American
men receive little in entitlements that they could exchange for a job other
than their unemployment compensation and those benefits are not long-term
and not broad-based.
Uncertainty also hangs over the amount of abuse and fraud that wage
subsidy programs would lead to. Hiring subsidies would apparently invite
employers to swap employees, perhaps after the spell of unemployment re-
quired for eligibility, and to move employees more freely from corporation
to corporation under the same parent company—all in order to collect in-
creased hiring subsidies. An advantage of the employment subsidies studied
here is that they would not encourage those abuses. However, employment
subsidies (and possibly hiring subsidies too) would inspire firms, especially
single-proprietor firms, to featherbed the payroll with phantom employees
under the names of persons, such as family members, whose silence would be
trusted. On balance, it might be advantageous for this as well as other reasons
to restrict the subsidies to full-time jobs, to good-sized firms where whistle-
blowers would be a deterrent, and to limit the subsidies to credits against the
firms’ tax liabilities. In another sort of abuse, the employer and employee
would agree to a reduced wage, which would add to the subsidy earned, and
a compensating increase in nonwage benefits, which, if undetected or not
counted as compensation, would not add to the subsidy earned. For this
reason, a graduated subsidy must decrease slowly with the wage rate so that
this temptation is not too strong in relation to the monitoring powers of the
tax authorities. Yet another abuse would draw upon the collusion of third
parties. To earn increased employment subsidies an employer might reduce
the wage rate of employees and compensate them with side jobs above their
normal pay rates at a cooperating firm, which might do the same with the
first firm or with other firms. Similiarly, under the exisiting Earned Income
Tax Credit program awarding subsidies directly to the taxpayer reporting low
earnings, the wage can be reduced and the employee compensated through
special discounts obtained from third parties. It may be, however, that such
abuses could be deterrred by punishing them with the same severity meted
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out to other kinds of tax fraud.
Appendix
1. To prove that Li/L¯ is decreasing in r, we obtain from (7) the relation
r = R(vhi L¯/y
w
i , Li/L¯) with R1 < 0 and R2 < 0. Substituting the function R
for r in (8), we obtain a variable-interest-rate labor supply schedule in the
(Li/L¯, v
h
i L¯/y
w
i ) plane, whose slope is given by
d(
vhi L¯
ywi
)
dLi
L¯
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
LS
=
1 + [ θ+ρ
r+θ
] + [ θ(θ+ρ)
1+(vhi L¯/y
w
i )(Li/L¯)
]
[ θ+ρ
r+θ
](
vhi L¯
ywi
)−2{1− [ 1
(1+(r/θ))(1+(vhi L¯/y
w
i )
−1(Li/L¯)−1)
]}
> 0.
As we move northeast along the variable-interest-rate labor supply function,
(7) tells us that the interest rate is declining.
2. To prove that at given r, the tax-subsidy policy shifts the aggregate supply
of wealth schedule to the right, we express (44) as W = Ψ(r, sF). Taking a
total derivative through (44) with respect to sF we obtain
Ψ2 = B{[1− β(ζ + r + θ)]− β(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)²}²2,
where B ≡ (r − ρ)/[(θ + ρ− r)(r + θ)]. The assumption that the labor-cost
elasticity of the zero-profit curve exceeds one implies that the reduced-form
ZP curve cuts the hyperbola from below in the (Ni, v
f
i /Λi) plane. The slope
of the hyperbola is given by−(vfi /Λi)N−1i , which equals−[1−β(ζ+r+θ)]N−1i
around the equilibrium while the slope of the reduced-form ZP curve is given
by −β(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2). Hence,
[1− β(ζ + r + θ)] > β(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)².
Accordingly, Ψ2 > 0.
From (41), we can express total asset demand as A = Θ(r, sF).We obtain
the following derivative:
Θ2 = β²2,
which is positive. Noting (46), it is clear that Θ2 > Ψ2.
3. It is straightforward to show that
Ψ1 = βB{²[θ(θ + ρ)
(r − ρ)2 − ζ2Ω1]− ²1B
−1[B²(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)− 1]}Λmean.
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Noting (46), the condition
[1− β(ζ + r + θ)] > β(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)²
can be re-expressed as
B²(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2) < 1.
Thus for Ψ1 to be positive, it is required that
[
θ(θ + ρ)
(r − ρ)2 − ζ2Ω1] >
²1
²
[
B²(ζ1 + ζ2Ω2)− 1
B
] > 0.
Hence a necessary condition for the aggregate supply of wealth curve to
be positively-sloped when the labor-cost elasticity of the zero-profit curve
exceeds one is that [θ(θ + ρ)/(r − ρ)2] > ζ2Ω1.
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                        Figure 2: Labor, Product and Capital Market Equilibrium 
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                  Figure 4: Comparison of Flat and Graduated Subsidies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     h  i
 
                                                                                                                         SSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                     ZP 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                  N i  
                           Figure 5: Effects of a Flat Subsidy 
